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ABSTRACT
Malware Classification with Gaussian Mixture Model-Hidden Markov
Models
by Jing Zhao

Discrete hidden Markov models (HMM) are often applied to the malware detection
and classification problems. However, the continuous analog of discrete HMMs, that
is, Gaussian mixture model-HMMs (GMM-HMM), are rarely considered in the field
of cybersecurity. In this study, we apply GMM-HMMs to the malware classification
problem and we compare our results to those obtained using discrete HMMs. As
features, we consider opcode sequences and entropy-based sequences. For our opcode
features, GMM-HMMs produce results that are comparable to those obtained using
discrete HMMs, whereas for our entropy-based features, GMM-HMMs generally
improve on the classification results that we can attain with discrete HMMs.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction

Due to COVID-19, businesses and schools have moved their work online and some
explore the possibility of going online permanently [1]. This trend makes cybersecurity
more important than ever before.
Malware, includes different types of malicious programs such as viruses, Trojan
horses, worms, etc [2]. They are designed to "deliberately fulfills the harmful intent of
an attacker" [3]. Those harmful actions include stealing private information, deleting
sensitive data without consent, disrupt computer systems, etc [4].
The study of malware has been active for decades [5]. Malware detection and
classification are fundamental topics in the study of malware. Traditionally, signature
detection has been the most prevalent method for detecting malware, but recently,
machine learning techniques have proven their worth, especially for dealing with
advanced types of malware. Many machine learning techniques have been applied
to the malware problem, including hidden Markov models (HMM) [6], 𝑘-nearest
neighbors (KNN) [7], support vector machines (SVM) [8], and a wide variety of neural
network based techniques [9]. Each machine learning technique has its own advantages
and disadvantages. It is not the case that any one technique is best for detecting all
types of malware---there are many different types of malware, and many different
features that can be considered. Thus, it is useful to explore different techniques
and algorithms in an effort to extend our knowledge base for effectively dealing with
malware. In this paper, we consider Gaussian mixture model-hidden Markov models
(GMM-HMMs), which can be viewed as the continuous analog of typical (discrete)
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HMMs.
Discrete HMMs are well known for their ability to learn important statistical
properties from a sequence of observations. For a sequence of discrete observations,
such as the letters that comprise a selection of English text, we can train such a
discrete HMM to determine the parameters of the (discrete) probability distributions
that underlie the training data. However, some observation sequences are inherently
continuous, such as a signal extracted from speech, as opposed to letters extracted
from English text. In such cases, a discrete HMM is not directly applicable. While
we can discretize a continuous signal, there will be some loss of information. As an
alternative to discretization, we can attempt to model the continuous probability
density functions that underlie continuous training data.
Gaussian mixture models (GMMs) are probability density functions that are
represented by weighted sums of Gaussian distributions [10]. By varying the number
of Gaussian components and the weights assigned to each, GMMs can approximately
model any continuous probability distributions arbitrarily well [11]. It is possible to
train HMMs to learn the parameters of GMMs, and the resulting GMM-HMM models
are widely used in speech recognition [12, 13].
In the field of cybersecurity, GMMs have been used, for example, as a clustering
method for malware classification [14]. However, to the best of our knowledge, GMMHMMs have not been previously considered in the context of malware detection or
classification. In this research, we apply GMM-HMMs to the malware classification
problem, and we compare our results to discrete HMMs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss relevant related work. Chapter 3 provides background on the various models considered,
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namely, GMMs, HMMs, and GMM-HMMs. Malware classification experiments and
results based on discrete features are discussed in Chapter 4. Since GMM-HMMs are
more suitable for continuous observations, in Chapter 5 we present another set of
malware classification experiments based on continuous entropy features. We provide
our conclusions and we discuss possible directions for future work in Chapter 6.

3

CHAPTER 2
Related Work

A lot of work has been completed on exploring malware detection and classification.
This chapter discusses about the previous work on malware analysis using different
techniques. It also introduces the related work implemented by GMMs, HMMs and
GMM-HMMs.
As mentioned in [15], the malware analysis can be categorized into static analysis,
dynamic analysis or the hybrid. In the static analysis, the study is conducted without
executing the malware. The features used in static analysis include byte sequence,
opcodes, string signatures, etc. While in the dynamic analysis, the behavior of a
malicious program is analyzed through executing the malware. The dynamic analysis
requires a controlled environment to run executables and observe the outcome [16].
Using machine learning techniques for malware detection and classification is
popular in both static and dynamic malware analysis. In [17], the author applied
Naive Bayes and Multinominal Naive Bayes on the string data and the n-grams of
byte sequences extracted from the executable files, obtaining results outperformed the
traditional signature-based method. More machine learning techniques, such as SVM,
Decision Tree, and boosted Decision Tree were explored by the authors in [18] and
have further proved the effectiveness of those methods. Converting binary files into
gray-scale images has opened up more opportunities for malware analysis [19]. In [7],
they converted binary executables into images and used KNN to classify malware
into different families. Using neural networks is another prominent technique for
malware detection and classification. The author in [20] applied neural networks on a

4

large-scale malware classification system and reduced the error rate by 43% comparing
to a previous technique using logistic regression.
A Gaussian mixture model (GMM) is one of a probability density models [21] that
is a weighted sum of multiple Gaussian distributions. The advantage of a Gaussian
mixture model is that it can describe variations of data distributions by changing the
number of components and the values of weights [11]. GMM allows for modeling a
more arbitrary distribution and has higher modeling capability than a single Gaussian
function. Although the real distribution is not similar to a Guassian distribution, the
combination of several Gaussians is able to make the model robust [22]. Due to the
flexibility of GMM, it is capable of simulating all kinds of distributions. One of the
main use of GMMs is distribution estimation in different fields such as wave elevation
in Oceanography [23]. With a proper estimation of the distribution, the application
can extend to anomaly detection [24], signal mapping, and positioning [25]. As a
trade-off, the cost of calculation also increases while the model gets more complicated.
Besides distribution estimation, GMM is also a clustering method for classification [26]. Parameter fitting leads to a convergence in distribution which gives a
natural process of clustering the data. The author in [27] used GMM as a classification
method to segment brain lesions.
HMM is another probabilistic model to describe how events evolve by studying the
sequence of observations of events. It describes the evolution of events by providing
the probability of each observation at each state and by transitioning from one state
to another. The event is considered as a Markov process, a process in which each
event is only determined by the previous event, not other earlier events. Each event
stays in some state that is unknown from the observer and each event can transit
from one state to another with a certain probability. Due to the feature of a Markov
5

process, HMM has naturally been used in the signal processing area. One of a popular
uses is speech recognition [28]. Due to its robustness and the efficiency, HMM is
also widely used in medical area such as Sepsis detection [29] and human brain study
through functional magnetic resonance imaging [30]. Motion recognition is another
area where HMM plays a vital role, such as recognizing dancing moves [31] and 3D
gestures [32]. HMMs have been applied on malware classification as well. In [33],
the authors trained models and generated scores using HMMs, then applied KNN to
cluster samples into classes. HMMs, as well as profile hidden markov models(PHMMs)
have also been applied on dynamic analysis using API calls, and the result shows that
the dynamic analysis outperforms the static analysis using static features, such as
opcodes [34].
As an extension to HMM, GMM-HMM has also been widely used in classification
problems. Given the flexibility of GMM, GMM-HMM is capable of studying more
complex patterns underlying the sequence of observations. Yao et al. [35] used GMMHMM to classify network traffic with different protocols. Moreover, GMM-HMM
has also been used in motion detection. For more complex poses, GMM-HMM has
performed better than a pure HMM [36].
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CHAPTER 3
Background
This chapter introduces the mathematical definition for GMMs, HMMs and
GMM-HMMs. We presented the model training procedure using HMMs and extends
the technique to GMM-HMMs, as well as parameter re-estimation and scoring. Lastly,
in order to validate the function of the model, we apply it to English text classification.
3.1

Formulation of GMM
GMM is a probabilistic model which is combined by multiple Gaussian component

distributions. Mathematically, the probability density function (PDF) of a GMM is a
weighted sum of 𝑀 Gaussian PDFs. As described in [37], a GMM is in the form of
𝑝(𝑥|𝜆) =

𝑀
∑︁

𝜔𝑖 𝑔(𝑥|𝜇𝑖 , Σ𝑖 ),

𝑥=𝑖

where 𝑥 is a 𝐷 dimension vector; 𝜔𝑖 is the weight of each Gaussian component;
𝜇𝑖 and Σ𝑖 are the mean and the covariance matrix of the 𝑖th component of GMM
respectively. The sum of the mixture weights should be 1. Each component of GMM
is a multivariate Gaussian distribution function
{︂
1
𝑔(𝑥|𝜇𝑖 , Σ𝑖 ) =
exp −
(2𝜋)𝐷/2 |Σ𝑖 |1/2
3.2

given by
}︂
1
′ −1
(𝑥 − 𝜇𝑖 ) Σ𝑖 (𝑥 − 𝜇𝑖 ) .
2

(1)

Formulation of HMMs
To better understand the HMM, we use mathematical notations to define the

model as described in [6]. The notations of the model is given by
𝑇 : number of observations in the observation sequences
𝒪 : {𝒪0 , 𝒪1 , 𝒪2 , . . . , 𝒪𝑇 −1 }, the observation sequence
7

𝐾: number of unique symbols in the observation sequence
𝑁 : number of states
𝜋: initial state distribution
𝐴: states transition matrix with size 𝑁 × 𝑁
𝐵: the probability of each unique observation symbol at each state
The HMM is therefore denoted by 𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋). The component 𝑎𝑖𝑗 of 𝐴 matrix
is given by
𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃 (state 𝑞𝑗 at 𝑡 + 1| state 𝑞𝑖 at 𝑡).
In a discrete HMM, 𝐵 matrix is of size 𝑁 × 𝐾. Each row of 𝐵 matrix represents the
probability distribution of the observation symbol at that state. Specifically, each
element of 𝐵 matrix is given by
𝑏𝑖 (𝒪) = 𝑃 (observation 𝒪 at 𝑡| state 𝑞𝑖 at 𝑡).
HMM is able to answer the following three problems [6]:
1. Given a sequence of observations and the model 𝜆 = (𝜋, 𝐴, 𝐵), calculate the
probability of the observing sequence.
2. Given the model and the observation sequences, find the optimum states sequences. That is, find out the most possible state of each observation in the
sequence.
3. Find out the model 𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋) which gives the highest possibility for a given
observation sequence with a predefined dimension for 𝑁 and 𝐾.
Solutions to the three problems provide methods for model construction, parameters
re-estimation and model scoring.
8

3.3

Formulation of GMM-HMM
The overall model structure of a GMM-HMM is similar to a HMM. In a GMM-

HMM, the difference happens to be the 𝐵 matrix. In a discrete HMM, the 𝐵 matrix
is a discrete probability distribution for each state given the number of symbols. In
a GMM-HMM, the probability of each observation at a certain state is determined
by the PDF, which is described by a GMM. Specifically, the PDF of having each
observation at state 𝑞𝑖 at time 𝑡 is in the form
𝑝𝑖 (𝒪𝑡 ) =

𝑀
∑︁

𝑐𝑖𝑚 𝑔(𝒪𝑡 |𝜇𝑖𝑚 , Σ𝑖𝑚 ),

1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁,

0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 − 1,

(2)

𝑚=1

where

𝑀
∑︁

1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁.

𝑐𝑖𝑚 = 1,

𝑚=1

The parameter 𝑀 is the total number of Gaussian mixtures components; 𝑐𝑖𝑚 is the
mixture coefficient or the weight of 𝑚th Gaussian mixture at state 𝑞𝑖 ; 𝜇𝑖𝑚 and Σ𝑖𝑚
are the mean vector and covariance matrix for the 𝑚th Gaussian mixture at state 𝑞𝑖 .
As a modification for equation (1), 𝑔(𝒪𝑡 |𝜇𝑖𝑚 , Σ𝑖𝑚 ) is in the form
1
𝑔(𝒪𝑡 |𝜇𝑖𝑚 , Σ𝑖𝑚 ) =
exp
(2𝜋)𝐷/2 |Σ𝑖𝑚 |1/2

{︂

}︂
1
′ −1
− (𝒪𝑡 − 𝜇𝑖𝑚 ) Σ𝑖𝑚 (𝒪𝑡 − 𝜇𝑖𝑚 ) ,
2

(3)

where 𝐷 is the dimension of each observation. The 𝐴 matrix and 𝜋 remain the same
with the HMM.
In a GMM-HMM, the notations are defined by
𝑁 : number of states
𝑀 : number of Gaussian mixture components
𝐷: dimension of each observation
𝒪: (𝒪0 , 𝒪1 , 𝒪2 , . . . , 𝒪𝑇 −1 ) the observation sequence
𝑇 : number of observations in a observation sequence
9

𝜋: initial distribution
𝐴: state transition matrix, size 𝑁 × 𝑁
𝑐: weight of each Gaussian mixture at each state, size 𝑁 × 𝑀
𝜇: mean value of each Gaussian mixture component at each state, size 𝑁 ×𝑀 ×𝐷
Σ: co-variance matrix of 𝑀 Gaussian mixture components at each state, size
𝑁 ×𝑀 ×𝐷×𝐷
As GMM-HMMs inherently follow the structure of HMMs, a portion of notations share
the same meanings with HMMs, such as the number of states 𝑁 , total observations
𝑇 , the initial state 𝜋 and the state transitioin matrix 𝐴. The difference is that the
underlying distribution of the observation data is characterized by a GMM. Therefore,
a GMM-HMM is defined by 𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝜋, 𝑐, 𝜇, Σ), where 𝑐, 𝜇 and Σ uniquely defines the
PDF listed in (2). The dimensions of data is given by 𝐷. In this study, the dimension
of the experiment data is 1. Similar to HMMs, we need to get solutions for the three
problems mentioned in Section 3.2.
3.4

GMM-HMM Parameters Re-estimation and Scoring
To use GMM-HMM as a classification technique to classify malware samples,

we need to solve problem 3 and problem 1 as mentioned in 3.2. Given a malware
training sample, we use problem 3 to obtain the parameters to describe the malware.
For testing, we use the solution to problem 1 to score each sample.
3.4.1

Solution to problem 1

Given a model 𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝜋, 𝑐, 𝜇, Σ) and a sequence of observations 𝒪 =
{𝒪0 , 𝒪1 , 𝒪2 , . . . , 𝒪𝑇 −1 }, the probability of the likelihood of the observing sequence is
obtained by 𝑃 (𝒪|𝜆). The forward algorithm, or the alpha pass is used to find out

10

𝑃 (𝒪|𝜆) [6].
Similar to a discrete HMM mentioned in [6], in the alpha pass algorithm, we
have 𝛼𝑡 (𝑖) = 𝑃 (𝒪0 , 𝒪1 , . . . , 𝒪𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖 |𝜆), which gives the probability of a sequence
of observation up to time 𝑡 with the state of time 𝑡 being 𝑞𝑖 . The probability can be
reformed to be
𝑃 (𝒪|𝜆) =

𝑁
−1
∑︁

𝛼𝑇 −1 (𝑖)

(4)

𝑖=0

where
𝛼𝑡 (𝑖) =

[︃𝑁 −1
∑︁

]︃
𝛼𝑡−1 (𝑖)𝑎𝑗𝑖 𝑏𝑖 (𝒪𝑡 ).

(5)

𝑗=0

At 𝑡 = 0, 𝛼0 (𝑖) = 𝜋𝑖 𝑏𝑖 (𝒪0 ).
In a discrete HMM, 𝑏𝑖 (𝒪𝑡 ) gives the probability of observing 𝒪𝑡 at time 𝑡 in state
𝑖. In a GMM-HMM, however, simply replacing 𝑏𝑖 (𝒪𝑡 ) in (5) by the PDF from (2)
gives the likelihood but not the exact probability. To obtain the probability we need
to take an integral of a small region around observation 𝒪𝑡 [38].
∫︁

𝒪𝑡 +𝜖

𝑝𝑖 (𝒪𝑡 |𝜃𝑖 ) 𝑑𝑜,

𝑏𝑖 (𝒪𝑡 ) =

(6)

𝒪𝑡 −𝜖

with 𝜃𝑖 being the probabilistic parameters of 𝑐𝑖 , 𝜇𝑖 and Σ𝑖 . 𝜖 is a small range, which
demonstrates the continuity of observations.
3.4.2

Solution to Problem 3

The alpha pass calculates the probability of observing the sequence from the
beginning up to time 𝑡. The beta pass algorithm [6] is used to describe the other half
of the observation from time 𝑡 + 1 to the end. In the beta pass algorithm, we have
𝛽𝑡 (𝑖) = 𝑃 (𝒪𝑡+1 , 𝒪𝑡+2 , . . . , 𝒪𝑇 −1 |𝑥𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖 , 𝜆). At 𝑡 = 𝑇 − 1, 𝛽𝑡 (𝑖) = 1. Therefore we
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have
𝛽𝑡 (𝑖) =

𝑁
−1
∑︁

(7)

𝑎𝑖𝑗 𝑏𝑗 (𝒪𝑡 )𝛽𝑡+1 (𝑗).

𝑗=0

In a HMM, to estimate 𝐴, a "di-gamma" [6] is defined as follows.

𝛾𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑃 (𝑥𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖 , 𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝑞𝑗 |𝒪, 𝜆).
It defines the probability of the observation 𝒪 being at state 𝑞𝑖 at time 𝑡 and transiting
to state 𝑞𝑗 at time 𝑡 + 1. Using the alpha pass and the beta pass, we can obtain the
result for 𝛾𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗) [6]. The sum of "di-gamma" with respect to the transiting states
gives the probability of the observation being at state 𝑞𝑖 at time 𝑡. The representation
is
𝛾𝑡 (𝑖) =

𝑁
∑︁

𝛾𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗).

𝑗=1

Therefore, the transiting probability of 𝑎𝑖𝑗 in 𝐴 is given by
𝑇∑︀
−2

𝑎𝑖𝑗 =

𝛾𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗)

𝑡=0
𝑇∑︀
−2

𝛾𝑡 (𝑖)

𝑡=0

To solve problem 3 for GMM-HMM, we use a similar strategy as the one used in
HMM. We define a "gamma GMM-HMM", which is a generalization of the "gamma"
from HMM [6]. The form is given by
(8)

𝛾𝑡 (𝑗, 𝑘) = 𝑃 (𝑥𝑡 = 𝑞𝑗 |𝑘, 𝒪, 𝜆),

for 𝑡 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑇 − 2, 𝑗 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁 and 𝑘 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑀 . It represents the
probability of being state 𝑞𝑗 at time 𝑡 given by the 𝑘th Gaussian mixture accounting
for 𝒪𝑡 . According to [12], the form of 𝛾𝑡 (𝑗, 𝑘) is given by
𝛾𝑡 (𝑗, 𝑘) =

𝛼𝑡 (𝑗)𝛽𝑡 (𝑗)
𝑁
∑︀
𝑗=1

𝑐𝑗𝑘 𝑁 (𝒪𝑡 |𝜇𝑗𝑘 , Σ𝑗𝑘 )

·

𝑀
∑︀

𝛼𝑡 (𝑗)𝛽𝑡 (𝑗)

𝑚=1
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𝑐𝑗𝑚 𝑁 (𝒪𝑡 |𝜇𝑗𝑚 , Σ𝑗𝑚 )

,

where 𝛼𝑡 (𝑗) is the alpha pass defined in equation (5) and 𝛽𝑡 (𝑗) is from (7); 𝑐𝑗𝑘 is the
weight of the 𝑘th mixture component.
The re-estimation for weight 𝑐 for each Gaussian mixture is given by
𝑇∑︀
−1
𝛾𝑡 (𝑗, 𝑘)
𝑡=0
𝑐ˆ𝑗𝑘 = 𝑇 −1 𝑀
,
∑︀ ∑︀
𝛾𝑡 (𝑗, 𝑘)
𝑡=0 𝑘=1

for 𝑗 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁 and 𝑘 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑀 [39, 12]. The numerator can be interpreted as
the expected number of transitions from 𝑞𝑗 determined by the 𝑘th Gaussian mixtures
and the denominator can be seen as the expected transitions from state 𝑞𝑗 given by
𝑀 Gaussian mixtures.
Accordingly, the re-estimation for 𝜇𝑗𝑘 and Σ𝑗𝑘 are in the form
𝑇∑︀
−1

𝜇
ˆ𝑗𝑘 =

𝛾𝑡 (𝑗, 𝑘)𝒪𝑡

𝑡=0
𝑇∑︀
−1

𝛾𝑡 (𝑗, 𝑘)

𝑡=0

and

𝑇∑︀
−1

Σ̂𝑗𝑘 =

𝛾𝑡 (𝑗, 𝑘)(𝒪𝑡 − 𝜇𝑗𝑘 )(𝒪𝑡 − 𝜇𝑗𝑘 )′

𝑡=0
𝑇∑︀
−1

,
𝛾𝑡 (𝑗, 𝑘)

𝑡=0

for 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁 and 𝑘 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑀 .
3.4.3

GMM-HMM Scoring

To score an observation sequence means that we want to get the 𝑃 (𝒪|𝜆). As a
GMM-HMM is an extension to an HMM, the scoring process is the same as an HMM
except that we will use a GMM to calculate the probability for the presence of each
observation. Once the parameter re-estimation process completes, the probability of
observing a certain certain sequence is obtained through the alpha pass, according
to (4). A more efficient calculation method -- HMM scaling [6] is used.
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3.5

Model Performance Evaluation
A receiver operating characteristics (ROC) is a two dimensional graph that

illustrates the trade-offs between true positive rate and false positive rate [40]. In
a good classifier, the true positive rate should be close to 1 while the false positive
rate remains the minimum. Therefore, we use the area under a receiver operating
characteristics curve (AUC) as the measurement for evaluating models.
3.6

A Simple Example of GMM-HMM
As an example to test the GMM-HMM model, we experiment on real and fake

English text classification. The English text experiment has been conducted using
HMM in [41], and the model had successfully differentiated the vowels from consonants
by giving a sequence of English text. We present the same experiment using a GMMHMM to see how a GMM-HMM performs compared to an HMM. We also generate
some fake English texts to test if the trained GMM-HMM model is able to differentiate
them. The AUC is used to measure the performance of each model. As we use discrete
observations in this experiment, instead of taking the integral of the probability
density function to get probabilities, we simply use the probability density function
itself in the training process. The same is happening at the scoring phase.
The English training data is from the "Brown corpus" [42]. To make the context
ready for training, we convert all context to lowercase and remove punctuation, with
only 26 English alphabets and spaces left. The total 27 symbols are encoded by
integers from 0 to 26. As each observation is an encoded number, the dimension of
each observation is 1. We set 𝑁 = 2, 𝑀 = 6 (6 Gaussian mixture models) and T =
50000. 𝐴 is a 2 × 2 matrix with each row being stochastic. 𝜋 is also a row stochastic
matrix with a size of 1 × 2. The weights of mixture components 𝑐 is initialized with
14

row stochastic values. We use the global mean value (the mean of all observations)
and global variance (the variance of all observations) as the initialization value for
the 𝜇 and Σ. In the beginning, each component of the Gaussian mixtures has the
same mean value and the variance.
A GMM-HMM model is trained with 100 random restarts. As the observations
are discrete symbols, the probability of observing each observation in state 𝑖 at time 𝑡
is estimated by the probability density function, given by equation (2). The trained
result shows that GMM-HMM has successfully identified the vowels in one state.
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of observations in each state. Space is represented
by the capitalized letter "S".

Figure 1: English letter distributions in each state

As Figure 1 shows, all vowels have been successfully selected in State 0. Table 1
lists the trained mean value for each Gaussian mixture. The mean value of each
Gaussian mixture component corresponds to the encoded value of each vowel--0, 4, 8,
15

States

GM1

0
1

26.000000
22.603863

GM2

GM3

14.000000 8.000000
6.308116 15.000000

GM4

GM5

GM6

4.000000
12.080905

20.000000
2.313083

0.000000
18.140713

Table 1: The mean value of each Gaussian mixture in each state

14 and 20 represent letter "a", "e", "i", "o", "u" respectively. The space is encoded
by 26. The GMM-HMM has separated the vowels and the space into one state by
each Gaussian mixture component representing one symbol, and the rest into another
state.
To compare the GMM-HMM and the HMM, we trained an HMM using the same
English text dataset with 𝑁 = 2, 𝑀 = 27. The total observation we used for training
is 𝑇 = 50000. We use AUC to measure the performance of each model while testing
with fake English text samples. The total testing samples include alphabets sequences
from an English article and 50 fake English text by exchanging certain alphabets,
such as changing "a" to "n", "e" to "z", etc.
Figure 2 presents the AUC of 5 testing examples generated by HMM and GMMHMM. When converting the letter "e" to "z", both models successfully differentiated
the fake samples from the real sample as letter "e" is much more frequently used than
the letter "z". The probability of observing "e" is much higher than observing "z".
Switching these two letters will make it easy for both models to make decisions. The
performance of these two models, however, varies when the English letters are replaced
using different rules. The experiments results have shown that GMM-HMM and
HMM are sensible to the fake level of English text as the performance changes with
different testing samples. It is hardly possible to test all cases with these two models,
but based on the experiments we conducted, the performance of a GMM-HMM is
16

Figure 2: ROC comparison by HMM and GMM-HMM
comparable to an HMM in differentiating fake English text.
Since we know the number of vowels beforehand, it is not reasonable to set the
number of Gaussian mixture components other than 6 (5 vowels and the space). This
is also the key factor result in successfully differentiating the vowels from consonants
in this experiment. As the observations are discrete, we are essentially a GMM-HMM
to simulate the discrete probability density function. The more closer the number of
"peaks" we select to that in a discrete probability density distribution, the similar the
performance we obtain to that from a discrete HMM.
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CHAPTER 4
Malware Classification Using Opcodes

The success on the English alphabets example has validated the GMM-HMM.
In this chapter, we apply GMM-HMMs on three malware families using opcodes as
features. In addition, we compare the results of GMM-HMM with the model trained
with HMMs.
4.1

Introduction to the dataset
The training data we use belongs to the Malicia dataset [43]. It comprises 19

families and total 11,688 binary files. We use the top three largest families in this
dataset, including Winwebsec, Zbot and Zeroaccess.
Winwebsec is a type of Trojan horse running in the Windows operating system.
It attempts to install malicious programs by displaying fake links to bait users [44].
Zbot is another type of Trojan family that tries to steal users’ core information by
attaching executable files through spam email messages [45]. Zeroaccess attempts
to store core information or components by creating hidden files. It can cause other
malicious actions such as downloading malware or opening backdoor [46]
Table 2 lists the number of samples in each malware category. To encode the
input, we extracted the top 30 opcodes of each malware, labeled them from 1 to
30, and labeled the rest of the opcodes as 31. We pick the top 30 opcodes as they
represent more than 90% of all opcodes, as shown in Table 3.
The samples of each malware are split into 80% for training and 20% for testing.
The training samples are concatenated into one file for training after encoding. 𝑇
18

Family

Samples

Winwebsec
Zeroaccess
Zbot

4360
2136
1305

Total

7801

Table 2: The number of samples in each malware family

Malware

% of top 30 opcodes

Winwebsec
Zeroaccess
Zbot

96.9%
95.8%
93.4%

Table 3: The percentage of Top 30 opcodes

observations will be used as the input to train models. The testing samples are also
encoded to be prepared for testing against each model.
We use the averaged AUC from a 5 fold-cross validation to measure the performance of models and compare the results. To compare the performance of HMM and
GMM-HMM, we also train a HMM for each malware family.
4.2

GMM-HMM on malware classification using opcodes
We set the length of observation 𝑇 = 100000 for training, with 𝑁 = 2. As malware

classification is not as straightforward as the English text example, the best choice for
the number of 𝑀 , i.e., the number of Gaussian mixtures, is unknown. In general, the
larger the 𝑀 , the more complex the model becomes, the longer computation time it
needs. Considering the computation efficiency, we experiment from 𝑀 = 2 to 𝑀 = 5.
We train a model with one malware family and test with the other two malware
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families. To test each model’s performance, we use one hundred samples from the
original malware family and another hundred instances from the testing malware
family.
For initialization, 𝜋 and 𝐴 are row stochastic matrices. The mean values and the
covariance are initialized with the global mean value and the global covariance of all
training input data.
4.3

Results and discussion
Figure 3 to Figure 5 give the average AUC for models trained with discrete

HMMs and GMM-HMMs with different values for 𝑚. For most of the models, the
GMM-HMM is able to obtain comparable results to the discrete HMM. The GMMHMM outperforms the HMM in some cases, but the improvement is slight. There are
cases that the larger the number for 𝑚, the better the performance of the model. For
the rest of the models, the differences of each model are relatively small. It is possible
that the training iterations are not large enough, or the opcodes sequences of malware
pairs are challenging for both HMMs and GMM-HMMs.

(a) Test with Zeroaccess

(b) Test with Winwebsec

Figure 3: HMM versus GMM-HMMs --- Zbot
It is worth mentioning that, during the experiments, we have observed that the
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(a) Test with Zbot

(b) Test with Zeroaccess

Figure 4: HMM versus GMM-HMMs --- Winwebsec

(a) Test with Zbot

(b) Test with Winwebsec

Figure 5: HMM versus GMM-HMMs --- Zeroaccess
model given by the highest training score does not necessarily become the best model.
An example is given by Figure 6 and 7. These figures exhibit the testing results for
models trained with Zbot and tested with Winwebsec with 𝑚 = 2 within one training
process. The model obtained a lower score performs better than the highest score
model in the testing phase. We can see that the observation distribution is highly
concentrated around symbol near 0 for the model with the highest training score.This
is more likely to happen when the number of Gaussian mixture components is small.
While on the other hand, the model with a lower score seems to be able to capture
more dynamics of the data distribution.
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Receiving a high training score but performing worse during testing is a typical
sign for over-fitting. As mentioned by the author in [47], GMMs have a singularity
issue when the data is highly collapsed on a single value, with a corresponding
covairance falling to 0. A more serious problem with the covariance being 0 is that
the it would cause numerical error while calculating the likelihood given by (3). A
quick fix to this issue is adding a small value of 𝑒𝑟𝑟 when the covariance gets close
to 0. The 𝑒𝑟𝑟 is chosen to be 0.001 in this study. However, this fix does not avoid
receiving a high value from the probability density function, which results in a high
score using our scoring metric. Since we use discrete opcodes as the training features,
this issue is easily to occur. For a discrete HMM, the sum of the probability of all
the observations in each state is 1, which is guaranteed in the training process. For
a GMM-HMM, the value obtaining from the probability density function for each
observation is proportional to the probability, but there is no such a limit to restrain
the sum of probability to be 1. This will cause problem especially when observations
collapse. Therefore, for discrete features, using HMMs is a advantageous method.
However, this does not mean that a GMM-HMM is not as good as a HMM. One
advantage of GMM-HMM is that it gives the flexibility to modify the complexity of
the model. For a discrete HMM, once training completes, there is not much room
to make modifications. For a GMM-HMM, we can extend the model’s capability by
changing the number of Gaussian mixture components. However, the trade-off is that
the computation cost increases while adding more mixture components. Having a
better understanding of the number of mixture components is helpful to select the
best model.
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(a) The AUC of a model with lower score

(b) The observation distribution of the model with a lower score
Figure 6: A model with a lower training score
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(a) The AUC of a model with the highest score

(b) The observation distribution of the model with the highest score
Figure 7: A model with the highest training score
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CHAPTER 5
Malware Classification Using Entropy
A GMM-HMM, by nature, is designed for continuous data, as opposed to discrete
features, such as opcodes. To fully take the advantage of the model, we used malware
binary files’ entropy as features to train models and evaluate the performance.
5.0.1

Entropy of malware

We have used a similar feature-extracting method as [48]. Specifically, we first
define a window size as the range to obtain entropy, then we move the window size
by a fixing sliding step till the end of the file. Both the window size and the sliding
step are the parameters that need to be tuned to get the model’s best performance.
In general, the sliding step needs to be smaller than the window size to ensure all
the information is captured. According to Shannon’s formula [49], the entropy(𝐸) is
obtained by
𝐸=−

∑︁

𝑝(𝑥) log2 𝑝(𝑥),

𝑥∈𝑊𝑖

where 𝑊𝑖 is the 𝑖th window, and 𝑝(𝑥) is the frequency of the of byte 𝑥 within that
window range.
5.0.2

Parameters selection

Similar to [48], we use half of the window size as the sliding step. The entropy
gets smoothed out with a large window size. It removes noises but might fail in
capturing details. On the other hand, with a smaller window size, the number of
observations of each malware sample increases, which results in higher computation
costs. An example of entropy plot is given in Figure 8. To select the best values for
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Window size
Sliding step

512
256

256
128

128
64

Table 4: The window size and its corresponding sliding step

these parameters, we conduct experiments with different window sizes, as listed in
Table 4.
Similar to experiments with the opcodes, there are two states for all the models.
The number of Gaussian mixtures components are from 2 to 5. We train a model
with one malware family and test it against the other two families. To evaluate the
performance, we again used the ROC curve with 5-fold cross-validation.
Figure 9 presents the averaged AUC with 5-fold cross-validation for models
trained with Zbot. Each model is tested with 50 Winwebsec and Zeroaccess samples.
As shown in Figure 9, the performance has improved from the result using HMM.
Moreover, training samples with window size 256 and 128 have obtained better results
than models with window size 512. Finding the value for 𝑀 and selecting a proper
window size is a part of the fine-tuning process.
We have conducted similar experiments for Winwebsec and Zeroaccess. Varying
the window size generates similar results for models trained with Winwebsec. In this
case, a larger window size is appropriate, as it provides lower computation cost. The
best models for Zeroaccess are obtained at window size 128 and 512 for testing Zbot
and Winwebsec respectively.
The 𝜖 in (6) gives the range which is used to approximate the probability under
the continuous PDF. Specifically, the probability is given by the difference of the
cumulative distribution fuction (CDF) under the range of 2 × 𝜖. In theory, the smaller
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(a) Entropy with window size 512

(b) Entropy with window size 128
Figure 8: Entropy in different window size
the range, the more precise the probability we receive. However, one observation
we have met during the experiment is that the approximate probability gets close
to 0 if the 𝜖 is set too small, leading to an error in the scoring process. We take
experiments with the 𝜖 to be 1e−1, 1e−3 and 1e−6 and select the one resulting in the
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Options for 𝜖

1e−1

1e−3

1e−6

AUC for testing Zeroaccess
AUC for testing Winwebsec

0.87
0.96

0.86
0.94

0.87
0.92

Table 5: AUC of models trained with Zbot

Options for 𝜖

1e−1

1e−3

1e−6

AUC for testing Zbot
AUC for testing Zeroaccess

0.99
0.98

0.71
0.83

0.77
0.86

Table 6: AUC of models trained with Winwebsec

best performance for training models.
The model performance does not vary much for Zbot using different options for
𝜖, which is listed in Table 5. For maintaining a balance between the precision and
the performance, we let 𝜖 be 1e−6 for training the Zbot family. Whereas, for the
Winwebsec family, 1e−1 seems a better option in terms of the model performance.
Selecting the 𝜖 for Zeroaccess is a little bit tricky. A larger 𝜖 improves the AUC while
testing with Zbot, but it sacrifices the performance with Winwebsec. Considering a
smaller 𝜖 gives a better precision, we choose to stick with 𝜖 = 1e−6.
A consequential effect is that, the AUC of the model trained with Zeroaccess
is unsatisfactory, which can also be seen from Figure 11, especially with a larger
Options for 𝜖

1e−1

1e−3

1e−6

AUC for testing Winwebsec
AUC for testing Zbot

0.61
0.89

1.00
0.54

1.00
0.54

Table 7: AUC of models trained with Zeroaccess
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window size. The model trained with Zeroaccess generates similar scores for samples
in Zbot family. To better understand the reason behind it, we use Kullback–Leibler
divergence (KL divergence) [50] to compare the models trained with these two families
by assessing observation distributions obtained from the training process, as the score
is mostly determined by the probability of each observation.
The KL divergence is given as follows:
KL(𝑝‖𝑞) =

∫︁

∞

𝑝(𝑥)log
−∞

𝑝(𝑥)
,
𝑞(𝑥)

(9)

where 𝑝 and 𝑞 are probability density functions.
As each model have two states, there are total 4 combinations. The PDF 𝑝 and 𝑞
in (9) are not interchangeable, thus, we take the average value of the KL divergence
by swapping the position of 𝑝 and 𝑞 as the distance measurement for each combination.
Therefore, we define
KL(model1 , model2 ) =

KL(model1 ‖model2 ) + KL(model2 ‖model1 )
2

Among the 4 combinations, we select the minimum value as the distance for
measuring two models. The comparisons of difference models are listed in Table 8.
As the KL divergence is not symmetric, the ingredients of the final KL divergence are
listed in Table 9. The probability density functions are obtained from the models with
window size 128. It can be seen that Zbot and Zeroaccess are considered "similar"
according to the KL divergence result when compared to other model groups, as the
score of Zbot and Zeroaccess is lowest. However, this might only explain part of the
reason as other components, as the probabilities of transiting between states would
also affect the scoring process.
In this experiment, using entropy as features works well in malware classification.
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Models

KL divergence

KL(Zbot, Zeroaccess)
KL(Zbot, Winwebsec)
KL(Zeroaccess, Winwebsec)

611.58
1438.42
1295.79

Table 8: The KL divergence of different models

Models

KL(model1 ‖model2 )

KL(model2 ‖model1 )

Zbot versus Zeroaccess
Zbot versus Winwebsec
Zeroaccess versus Winwebsec

504.54
864.97
1797.33

718.60
2011.86
53.79

Table 9: The KL divergence of different models in detail

Nevertheless, there is a potential problem with entropy-based method. The value
of entropy is solely calculated based on the frequency of bytes. The content, or
the meaning of each byte does not affect the value of entropy. With an intricate
manipulation, it might be possible that two different sequences in terms of the context
receive similar scores due to a matching symbols appearance pattern.
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(a) Window size = 512

(b) Window size = 256

(c) Window size = 128
Figure 9: Entropy versus window size --- Zbot
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(a) Window size = 512

(b) Window size = 256

(c) Window size = 128
Figure 10: Entropy versus window size --- Winwebsec
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(a) Window size = 512

(b) Window size = 256

(c) Window size = 128
Figure 11: Entropy versus window size --- Zeroaccess
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we have explored the algorithm of building a GMM-HMM and have
applied GMM-HMMs on malware classification using opcodes and entropy. As an
extension to the discrete HMM, GMM-HMMs share a lot in common with HMMs,
including the model building procedure and the scoring process. The difference is that
GMM-HMMs use GMMs to characterize the distribution of the underlying data. This
provides benefits to this model as well as some drawbacks.
For discrete features, such as the sequence of English text, or malware opcodes,
building a GMM-HMM is essentially a process of simulating the discrete probability
distribution with GMMs. As GMM-HMMs has strong flexibility by varying the
number of components and adjusting the weights of each, it is able to capture the
discrete distribution of observing symbols as HMMs, resulting in a comparable model
performance. However, GMM-HMMs doesn’t perform well when the number of
the mixture components is not selected properly. For instance, if there are not
enough mixture components, the model may fail in capturing the full picture of the
distributions. Finding a proper number of mixtures needs prior understanding of
the data. Otherwise, it is more of a tuning process to figure out the best choice.
Nevertheless, HMMs can play a role as a benchmark providing a reference to the
result. Another issue for GMM-HMMs is that it can easily get over-fitted when
the observations are highly collapsed. This type of data distribution holds a small
covariance, which results in obtaining a large value in the PDF. When this happens, a
model receiving a high scores does not ensure to generalize well from training to testing.
As part of the future work, a proper over-fitting handling is needed for training with
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discrete features.
On the other hand, GMM-HMMs has shown its power for entropy-based features while doing malware classification. GMM-HMMs has the advantage of better
capturing the dynamics of continuous data. Moreover, we can easily examine the
data distribution in different states and use that to compare GMM-HMMs using KL
divergence. Despite of the flexibility of GMM-HMMs, it takes more efforts to select
proper parameters such as the number of mixture components. Having an insight of
the data distribution in advance would be beneficial for improving efficiency. One
thought that is worth trying in the future work is clustering the sample data to receive
an overview estimation of the distribution. Although it cannot inform which states the
cluster might belong to, it provides a meaningful estimation to initialize the number
of mixtures, and even indicate the mean values.
To fully take the advantage of GMM-HMMs, selecting proper features is essential.
In this study, we use entropy as features to train models. One potential issue about
entropy is that it only considers the frequency of bytes in a fixed window size, no
matter what content it represents. As a byproduct of using entropy, we need to
experiment extensively to select the best choice for window size, the sliding step,
etc, to figure out the best combinations. In the future work, we can explore other
continuous features.
The purpose of experimenting with GMM-HMMs is to extend the application
of HMMs to data with more complexity. For techniques that use HMMs as part of
the scoring method, or training method, they can replace HMMs by GMM-HMMs to
see if it can boost the performance. In addition, combining GMM-HMMs with neural
networks is another plausible technical trend, as GMM-HMMs are capable of handling
continuous data type.
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